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Siegel: How Many Critiques Must Historians Write

HOW MANY CRITIQUES MUST HISTORIANS
WRITE?

Stephen A. Siegel*
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Originalism,Federalism,and the American Constitutional
Enterprise:A HistoricalInquiry (Yale U. Press 2007). Pp. 320. $45.00.

Historians coined the epithet "law-office history" over a half-century ago to
describe the way Supreme Court Justices distort the historical record to provide support
for positions they take on constitutional controversies.I The epithet encompasses many
abuses of the historian's craft, such as cherry-picking evidence, ignoring the context in
which evidence was embedded, and drawing clear conclusions from evidence that was
conflicting or indeterminate.2
It is not that historians believe history never gives clear answers to constitutional
issues. Sometimes the answer is clear because the Constitution's text is clear. 3 When
questions involve one of the Constitution's abstract or ambiguous clauses, historians
agree that clear answers sometimes may be found through historical study of the clauses'
context.4 Yet frequently enough, historians and the Justices differ on what the answer
* Visiting Professor, University of Illinois College of Law, and Distinguished Research Professor, DePaul
University College of Law. The author thanks Richard Nowak, '10, University of Illinois College of Law, for
superb research assistance.
1. Howard Jay Graham, The FourteenthAmendment and School Segregation, 3 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1953);
Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 S. Ct. Rev. 119, passim. See also Charles A.
Miller, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History 68-69, 195-196 (Belknap Press 1969) (explicating

examples of the Court's "misuse" of history); Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Characterof Law-and-Order
Originalism:A Case Study of the Distortionsand Evasions of Framing-EraArrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago

Vista, 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 239, 418-419 (2002) (suggesting the proper epithet should be "judicial-chambers
history").
2. See e.g. Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., History and Legal Interpretation: The Early Distortion of the
Fourteenth Amendment by the Gilded Age Court, 25 Cath. U. L. Rev. 207, 229-230 (1976) (cherry-picking

evidence and improper certainty); Graham, supra n. 1, at 7 (taking evidence out of context); Kelly, supra n. 1,
at 144 (speaking of lawyers' briefs as offering "manipulated . . doctored, distorted, twisted, and suppressed
historical evidence . . . ."); Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism:An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Court's Quest

for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 217, 282-286 (2004) (empirical study of the Justices' citations in
federalism cases showing preferences between federalist and anti-federalist writings track the Justices'
preferred case outcomes). See also John Yoo, War and the ConstitutionalText, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1639, 1644
(2002) (discussing the symptoms of law-office history).
3. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and OriginalMeaning, 24 Const. Commentary 291, 305 (2007). This does not
mean that the Constitution's clear and specific text is always followed. Compare e.g. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2,
cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury") with e.g. Patton v. U.S., 281
U.S. 276, 298-299 (1930) (upholding bench trial after defendant waives right to jury); Schick v. U.S., 195 U.S.
65, 67-69 (1904) (upholding bench trials for "petty" offenses).
4. Jack N. Rakove, Confessions ofan Ambivalent Originalist,78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1346, 1351-1354 (2003);
Jack N. Rakove, Statement on the Background and History ofImpeachment, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 682, 686-
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6
provided by history is, 5 or whether history provides any answer at all.
The Supreme Court's reliance on law-office history is not confined to Justices of
any particular jurisprudential persuasion or political preference. 7 Nor is it confined to
majority or minority opinions. 8 Perhaps the use of law-office history is so widespread
because the norms of judicial-opinion writing require judges to assert certainty about
their decisions 9 and because cases must be decided within a time frame that is too short
for scholarly investigation. Undoubtedly, briefs written by lawyers who appear before
the Court promote its consideration of history written more to advance advocacy goals
than to faithfully recount the past.10
In response to the extensive literature on the Court's reliance on law-office history,
the Justices, in a striking demonstration of the irrelevance of academic writing to legal
practice even when that writing is clearly relevant to professional concerns, 1 1 not only
have continued to premise decisions on law-office history,12 but effectively have made
law-office history even more central to constitutional law by making "tradition" the
preferred technique for discovering nontextual liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment 1 3 and by adopting originalism as an influential mode for interpreting all

687, 690-691 (1999) (founding generation did not intend that misleading a civil jury was an impeachable
offense); Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of JudicialReview: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1031,

1041, 1047 (1997) (founding generation intended judicial review).
5. Compare e.g. N. Y Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-271 (1964) (agreeing with Justice Brandeis that
the founding generation believed in unfettered public debate without fear of punishment) with e.g. Leonard W.
Levy, Emergence ofa Free Press 199-220, 338-340 (Oxford U. Press 1985) (libel of public officials may be
criminally sanctioned when not true or not spoken with good motives).
6. Compare e.g. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489-490 (1954) (history is "inconclusive" on
whether Fourteenth Amendment was meant to prohibit segregated schools) with e.g. Earl M. Maltz, A
Dissenting Opinion to Brown, 20 S. Ill. U. L.J. 93 (1995) (Fourteenth Amendment was meant to permit
segregated schools).
7. See e.g. Kelly, supra n. 1, at 136-137 (both Chief Justice Warren and Justice Harlan wrote law-office
history in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)); Sanford Levinson, For Whom Is the Heller Decision

Important and Why? 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 315, 327 (2009) (saying both sides in Dist. of Columbia v.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), use law-office history).
8. Supra n.7.
9. See Linda Greenhouse, Becoming Justice Blackmun: Harry Blackmun's Supreme Court Journey 60

(Times Bks. 2005) (describing Justice Black advising Justice Blackmun, "Never agonize in an opinion," and
make them "sound as though it's clear as crystal.").
10. The norms of the legal profession, which promote advocacy rather than reflection, may well require the
assertion of certainty when none exists. It has also been suggested that the adversary process is supposed to sort
out the historical truth. I doubt it can, but even if it could it would justify law-office history written by lawyers,
not by judges.
11. As a startling rebuke to relevant historical writing, consider Justice Scalia's response to Alan Gura
when Gura recently urged the Court to use the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause rather
than its Due Process Clause to incorporate the Second Amendment. Scalia dismissed the notion, humorously
suggesting that Gura was "bucking for a -a place on some law school faculty" rather than acting like a lawyer.
Transcr. of Oral Argument at 7, McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (available at 2010 WL
710088). A lawyer who attended the argument told me that when Mr. Gura persisted with his Privileges or
Immunities Clause argument, Justice Scalia covered his eyes and shook his head in disbelief.

12. Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: "Meet the New Boss, Same As the Old
Boss", 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1095 (2009); Thomas Y. Davies, Selective Originalism: Sorting Out Which Aspects
of Giles s ForfeitureException to Confrontation Were or Were Not "Establishedat the Time of the Founding"

13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 605 (2009) (discussing recent criminal procedure cases); Andrew Koppelman,

Phony Originalismand the EstablishmentClause, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 727 (2009).
13. See e.g. Wash. v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism,

106 Mich. L. Rev. 1543, 1544 (2008).
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constitutional text. 14
Federalism is one area that illustrates the unfortunate phenomenon I have just
described. Over the past twenty-five years such luminaries as Forrest McDonald, Gordon
Wood, and Jack Rakove have written award-winning histories of the Constitution's
drafting and ratification asserting that in the 1780s and 1790s American federalism was a
novel advance in Western political thought that the founding generation understood and
articulated only in vague outline. 15 What the federal principle portended for the new
nation was something over which the Constitution makers had substantial disagreements
and about which leading framers and ratifiers changed their views as the drafting,
ratification, and implementation process unfolded. 16 Although there may well have been
agreement at the highest level of abstraction that in the new republic there would be
two layers of government, each exercising somewhat distinct and somewhat overlapping
powers - the workings of the unprecedented system were far from clear.
In contrast to these historians, over the same twenty-five-year period individual
Supreme Court Justices,17 and since the 1990s a majority of the Court,18 have written
opinions and made decisions based on the belief that "the Framers[] carefully crafted
[the] balance of power between the States and the National Government" 1 9 and that
balance provides clear and determinate answers to modern questions concerning federalstate relations. Relying on its knowledge of what "the Framers explicitly chose" 2 0 and
what "the Framers did not intend"21 with regard to federalism, the Court has limited
Congress's legislative powers,22 narrowly construed important federal statutes,
curtailed federal preemption, 24 restricted habeas review of state criminal convictions, 25
and expanded state immunity from citizen suits. 2 6 The "federalism revolution" 2 7 is one
14. See e.g. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (interpreting Second Amendment); Matthew J. Festa, Applying a
Usable Past: The Use of History in Law, 38 Seton Hall L. Rev. 479, 501-503 (2008) (among areas in which
originalism is influential are governmental structure, religion, criminal procedure, and property rights).
15.

Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 276-284 (U.

Press Kan. 1985) (discussing federalism's novelty); Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in
the Making of the Constitution 167-202 (Vintage Bks. 1996) (discussing the novelties, uncertainties, and
ambiguities of federalism); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 525, 545,
615 (U.N.C. Press 1998) (originally published 1969) (describing federalism as not fully conceived, "emergent,"
and a piece-meal development). See also Alison L. LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism

(Harv. U. Press 2010) (tracing the conception of federalism to colonial times, but not contesting that by the
1790s it was still understood only in broad outline).
16. Supra n. 15.

17. See e.g. Nev. v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 432 (1979) (Rehnquist, J. & Burger, C.J., dissenting); Garciav. San
Antonio Metro. TransitAuth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (Powell, J., Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J. & O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
18. See e.g. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000); Seminole Tribe ofFla.v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996).

19. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620. See also N. Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S. 104, 166 (1992).
20. N.Y., 505 U.S. at 166.
21. Id. at 180.
22. See e.g. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; US. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); N. Y v. US., 505 U.S. 104.
23. See e.g. Solid Waste Agency of N Cook Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs., 531 U.S. 159 (2001)

(construing reach of Clean Water Act narrowly to avoid constitutional doubts based on federalism).
24. See e.g. BFP v. Res. Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994) (without clear statement of intent federal statutes
will not displace traditional state powers); Gregoryv. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (same).
25. See e.g. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (not applying "plain statement" rule to determine
whether state judgment is based on federal or state law).
26. See e.g. Fed. Mar. Commn. v. S.C. St. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (state sovereign immunity bars

federal administrative agencies from adjudicating citizen complaints against states); Alden v. Me., 527 U.S. 706
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of the signature achievements of the Rehnquist Court. 28
With the Supreme Court's turn to history and its "federalist revival" 29 in full
bloom, Edward Purcell's Originalism, Federalism, and the American Constitutional

Enterprise30 ("OFACE") is a timely reconsideration of federalism's origins and
development. Purcell's study differs from McDonald's, Wood's, and Rakove's work in
that it focuses solely on federalism and covers the topic from the founding to the present
day. Moreover, as Purcell makes suggestions for a jurisprudential approach to federalism
issues that differ from originalism, OFACE is normative as well as descriptive and
analytic.
As in his previous prize-winning books, 3 1 Purcell seamlessly draws from his
expertise in history, law, political science, and jurisprudence. OFACE is well-worth
reading if only for its layers of learning. It is a compendium spanning over two hundred
years of American constitutional, institutional, political, and jurisprudential
development.32 Purcell discusses, inter alia, founding era debates about the extent of the
federal government's implied powers;33 the South's massive resistance to school
desegregation;34 changing views on whether the vice president is part of the executive or
legislative branch; 35 the development of local chambers of commerce and boards of
trade;36 urban competition for canal and railroad projects; Henry Clay's American
System;38 histories of theories of federalism;39 John C. Calhoun's and George
Sutherland's shifting claims about state's rights and federal power;4 0 and the growth of
the federal government's executive, legislative, and judicial branches. 41 In mentioning
this seemingly random collection of topics, I have merely scratched the surface of the
subjects Purcell discusses in his remarkably compact, accessible, and insightful history
(1999) (state sovereign immunity allows states to refuse to allow federal question suits against them in their
own courts).
27. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's FederalismDecisions, 69 U.

Chi. L. Rev. 429, 429 (2002).
28. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Individual Right to Federalism in the Rehnquist Court, 74 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 888 (2006); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Will the New FederalismBe the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court? 40

Val. U. L. Rev. 589 (2006).
29. Vicki C. Jackson, Federalismand the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle? 111 Harv. L. Rev.

2180, 2213 (1998).
30. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Originalism, Federalism, and the American Constitutional Enterprise: A
HistoricalInquiry (Yale U. Press 2007).
3 1. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution: Erie, the Judicial Power, and the
Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century America (Yale U. Press 2000); Edward A. Purcell, Jr.,
Litigation and Inequality: FederalDiversity Jurisdictionin IndustrialAmerica, 1870-1958 (Oxford U. Press
1992); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of

Value (U. Press. Ky. 1973).
32. Without meaning to take away from the luster of Purcell's text, I would recommend OFACE for its
footnotes alone. Scholars with no interest in federalism may well find the book an enjoyable, informative, and
useful read for its wealth of detail concerning the development of American government.
33. Purcell, supra n. 30, at 32, 41-42, 59-60.
34. Id at 64.
35. Id. at 43-44.
36. Id. at 94.
37. Id. at 94-97.
38. Purcell, supra n. 30, at 65-66.
39. Id. at 85-110.
40. Id. at 66-68.
41. Id at 111-136.
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of federalism.
OFACE's wealth of factual detail is superbly marshaled to support three theses.
The first is that at the founding the new Constitution's federalism principle was so
"unsettled,"42 "vague . . and conflict[ed]"43 that "any claim that the 'original' nature of
American federalism can serve as a specifically directive norm . . . is simply

mistaken." 44 Purcell's view is that although "[t]he Constitution's federal structure ...
was both evident and uncontested" 4 5 the "way that structure was to function in
practice,"46 how the two constitutionally mandated levels of government would "interact
with one another" 4 7 and "how far their powers would reach," 4 8 was so
"underdetermined" 49 that "the Constitution neither gave the federal structure any single
proper shape as an operating system of government nor mandated any particular and
timeless balance among its components." 50 In other words, Purcell fully reaffirms
McDonald's, Wood's, and Rakove's claim that the Constitution "furnished inadequate
direction in deciding most specific issues about the structure's proper limits and
operations." 5 1
As a confirmation of previous studies, the value of Purcell's first thesis lies in its
sustained treatment, which allows Purcell to present new proofs and extensive supporting
detail. In addition, it serves as a stepping stone to Purcell's novel second thesis, which is
that "even had there been some true 'original' balance, the constitutional structure the
founders established was inherently incapable of maintaining it." 5 2
Whether Purcell's counterfactual claim is permissible hyperbole or a positive claim
need not detain us. The fact is that from the founding to the present day, federalism has
been a volatile kaleidoscope of events, shifting claims, and clashing theories. Certainly
one reason for federalism's mutability is that there never was a "true 'original'
balance" 53 to cling or return to. But in a tour de force, Purcell supplies a seminal study of
"four inherent characteristics" of the federal structure that made federalism's protean
development "inevitable" and "unresolvable." 54 The largest part of OFACE is a
historically informed analysis of why the Nation's federal structure has been so dynamic.
In Purcell's words, the Nation's federal structure was "doubly blurred,
fractionated, instrumental, and contingent."55 Purcell explicates what he means by these
terms in four chapters followed by another four discussing the ever-changing
42. Id. at 193.

43. Purcell, supra n. 30, at 37.
44. Id. at 6.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id
Id.
Id.
Purcell, supra n. 30, at 6.
Id at 189.

50. Id. at 7.

51. Id. at 153.
52. Id. at 6. See also Purcell, supra n. 30, at 7 ("[E]ven had such a 'true' system existed in some 'original'
intent or understanding, the governmental structure the founders established could not have preserved it
unchanged over time.").
53. Id. at 6.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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governmental system to which they gave rise. These "consequential dynamics"56 involve
federalism's "kaleidoscopic politics,"57 "readjusting components,"58 "contested
authorities," 59 and "evolving understandings." 6 0
Purcell's elaboration of the claim that the federal structure had "four intrinsic
characteristics" that "together . . . rendered it impossible either to identify or to maintain

a definitive boundary between state and national authority" occupies most of the book
and accounts for the unusual decision for a book about originalism to discuss its subject
from the founding to the present.61 In this short review, I cannot properly recount
Purcell's intricate argument. Suffice it to say that Purcell provides a fascinating and fresh
analysis of American federalism. The feature I found most telling was Purcell's depiction
of federalism as a polyvalent, not a binary, system. Federalism, Purcell shows, does not
involve the relationship between two monoliths (the national government and the states).
The national government itself is fractured into three branches, and one of them, the
legislature, is itself broken into two houses. Moreover, over time, each branch of the
federal establishment grew and changed into something distinctly different from what it
was at the founding. The national establishment has even sprouted another branch, the
independent agencies, with its own interests and politics.62
The states also were fractured at the founding into thirteen entities with different
perspectives, and over time they multiplied into fifty entities that cooperated, competed,
and contended with each other as well as with the evolving branches of the national
government. Furthermore, each state itself is fractured into cities and different economic
and geographic areas that cooperate, compete, and contend among themselves as well as
with their own state for Washington's attention.63
With a surfeit of examples, Purcell's study shows that all these institutional
divisions created a welter of constantly shifting interests and alliances that cut
unpredictably across the supposed binary nation-state divide. The "intrinsic dynamism"
of interstate, intrastate, and even intrafederal politics "continuously generated changing
matrices of pressures on the .

.

. blurred constitutional lines between state and federal

power and prevented either side of the binary divide, states or nation, from maintaining
those lines clearly and consistently."64 The federal structure, Purcell concludes, "simply
incorporated far too many mutable and malleable parts divided by far too many murky
and manipulable lines either to define or to sustain any single and true balance." 65
In light of his first two theses, Purcell concludes OFACE with some suggestions as to
how the Justices should approach federalism questions. Purcell's general suggestion is
that the Justices must recognize that they, not the "Constitution or other 'originalist'

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 83.
Purcell, supra n. 30, at 85.
Id.at I11.
Id. at 140.
Id at 161.
Id. at 85.
See Purcell, supra n. 30, at 7-8, 38-47, 111-137.
Id at 47-52, 137-139.
Id.at 192.
Id.at 193.
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sources,"66 are responsible for the principles, doctrines, and decisions that govern the
nation-state relationship. Because the founding generation specified only the broad
67
outlines of the federal structure, the Justices should stop trying to apply "vacuous"
principles and categories supposedly imposed on them by the founders. Rather, they
should work from "specific, pragmatic, and empirically based analyses of the operations
of the federal structure and the likely practical consequences involved in accepting any
particular interpretation of its nature and limits."68
Federalism decisions should be "practical judgments," involving "careful, flexible,
and pragmatic line-drawing." 69 Although ultimately federalism decisions "must
necessarily be rooted in the [Justices'] personal values and interests," 7 0 the Constitution
provides a foundation for their task. The Constitution ordains a "'compound'
structure," 7 1 from which Purcell derives the "essential structural requirement" 72 that
both levels of government must have an "independent existence, efficacious operation,
and ultimate public accountability." 73 Moreover, the Constitution supplies the "ideals
and goals" 74 that federalism - as worked out by the Justices - is a tool to effectuate. 7 5
Purcell's view is that rather than the comfort of "guarantees" or "clear and specific
direction," what the Constitution provides is " 'guidance' - in the sense of informed and
aspirational counsel.",76 All else "rests ultimately in the wisdom and judgment of the
Court itself."7 7 This may well be, Purcell acknowledges, an "unsatisfying and
unnerving" situation, but it is "a fundamental aspect of the American constitutional
enterprise." 7 8
Given how persuasively argued OFACE is, it is possible that some originalists will
take comfort in the thought that Purcell's analysis "applies only to federalism" 79 because
federalism is the sole focus of his historically informed study. 80 I would not take refuge
in that thought. There are many areas and issues where, in the view of leading historians,
the Constitution's text and other originalist sources do not give clear and specific
direction. 8 1 Moreover, in some areas where the sources are clear, the results are highly

66. Id. at 194.
67. Purcell, supra n. 30, at 205.
68. Id. at 9.
69. Id. at 204.
70. Id. at 9.
71. Id. at 197.
72. Purcell, supra n. 30, at 194.
73. Id For this reason, Purcell approves of the "anti-commandeering" principle announced in N.Y, 505
U.S. 144. See Purcell, supra n. 30, at 194, 286 n.10.
74. Purcell, supra n. 30, at 198.
75. See id. at 198-200 (discussing the goals).
76. Id at 203.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 206.
79. Purcell,supra n. 30, at 193.
80. See also id. at 7 (saying his "conclusions . . . are based not on general theories of language or meaning
but on empirical evidence from the nation's history" based only on a "narrow and specific" study of
federalism.).
81. See e.g. Rakove, supra n. 15, at 3-22, 244-365 (discussing executive power, rights, and the founder's
approach to interpreting the Constitution).
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disturbing. 82
Originalists may also take comfort in the thought that Purcell's book investigates
only the Supreme Court's practice of originalism. Purcell does not study originalist
theory or the practice of originalism by academics. In fact, a fair number of academic
originalists recognize that the Constitution and other originalist sources may fail to give
clear answers to constitutional issues and they respond thoughtfully to the problem in
ways that differ from Purcell's.8 3 Still, the fact that the Justices have not shown
themselves to be good at doing history is a problem for originalism regardless of the
bonafides of its academic theory and academic practice.84
For that reason alone, Purcell's final thesis may be welcome as a timely turn away
from "judge as umpire" jurisprudence toward a jurisprudence that begins to flesh out
anew the view that "the Supreme Court is not, and has never been, simply a 'court of
law,' "85 but also is a " 'lawmaking' "86 institution, necessarily so, and rightfully so. Of
course, there is much more work to be done to flesh out the jurisprudence attendant upon
Purcell's reminder that when it comes to the Constitution's continuing development
"judicial 'lawmaking,' in fact, has become a key component of that enterprise." 8 7
Whatever one may think of Purcell's normative suggestions, OFACE's analytical parts
are a superb piece of history and political science. Its wealth of factual detail analyzes
federalism with subtlety and originality. OFACE is a substantial contribution to our
understanding of one of the oldest, most fundamental, and controversial facets of
American politics and constitutional law.
OFACE is, as well, a timely demonstration of what is (or what because of OFACE
will become) the historians' conventional wisdom: that the Constitution makers
established federalism as an integral part of American government without establishing
what federalism meant in practice. How long will it take before that insight also becomes
the conventional wisdom of the Justices?

82. See e.g. Levy, supra n. 5, at 199-220 (First Amendment permitted prosecutions for seditious libel);
Maltz, supra n. 6 (Fourteenth Amendment permitted segregated schools).
83. See Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporationand Originalist Theory, 18 J. Contemp. Leg. Issues 409, 436-

445 (2009) (discussing Keith Whittingon's, Randy Barnett's. and his own response to the problem of "failure
of constitutional

communication.").

Cf John Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in

ConstitutionalInterpretation, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2003, 2059-2061 (2009) (concluding on textualist grounds that
the Constitution's federalism principle has no directive power apart from specific constitutional provisions
adopted to implement federalism).
84. See Koppelman, supra n. 12, at 749-750 (suggesting that the increased production of originalist
scholarship will end up increasing the Justices' ability to find historical analyses that colorably support the
conclusion they want to reach on nonoriginalist grounds).
85. Purcell, supra n. 30, at 202.
86. Id. at 204.
87. Id
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